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Note
Patent Licensing and Discretion: Reevaluating
the Discretionary Prong of Declaratory
Judgment Jurisdiction After MedImmune
Paul J. LaVanway, Jr.*
Imagine that a patent holder approaches a potential licensee to initiate licensing discussions, expressly telling the licensee that she has "absolutely no plan whatsoever to sue" for patent infringement. 1 Did the patent holder just expose herself to
multimillion dollar liability, potentially being forced to defend
the enforceability and validity of her patent in litigation? 2 Before 2007, the answer was likely no, 3 but after MedImmune,
5
4
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the answer changes.

* J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. Ch.E.
2004, University of Wisconsin-Madison. The author thanks C. Michael Geise
for insightful discussion and assistance in formulating the topic and content of
this Note. The author also thanks the board and staff of the Minnesota Law
Review for their hard work and tireless effort in seeing this Note's journey to
publication. Most importantly, the author gives special thanks to his family,
and in particular Katie Mantz, for their unwavering love and support. Copyright © 2008 by Paul J. LaVanway, Jr.
1. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelecs., Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1375-76 (Fed.
Cir. 2007). The hypothetical I pose actually occurred and formed the basis for
the SanDisk opinion. Id.
2. Based on the estimated amount at stake, the median costs of patent
litigation range from $500,000 to $3,995,000. James Bessen & Michael J.
Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (citing AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP.
LAW Assoc., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2003, at 22 (2003)). But see
FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P., FOURTH ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY

FINDINGS 44 (2007), http://www.fulbright.com/mediaroom/files/2007/FJ6438
-LitTrends-vl3.pdf (noting that less than half of all surveyed companies are
willing to litigate patent infringement claims to a final judgment).
3. See, e.g., Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d
1054, 1056, 1059-60 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (concluding that Super Sack's unconditional promise not to sue for patent infringement divested the court of Article
III jurisdiction).
4. 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
5. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1376, 1383.
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In January 2007, the Supreme Court held that a nonrepudiating patent licensee may challenge the validity of the patent
underlying her license agreement. 6 The decision resulted in a
"sweeping change" in law, 7 which unsettled the licensing community by overruling a line of Federal Circuit precedent holding that a licensee in good standing lacks an actual controversy
sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional "case or controversy"
standing requirement of Article 111.8
A more insidious aspect of the MedImmune ruling was buried in the decision. In a detailed footnote, the Supreme Court
sharply criticized the Federal Circuit's two-part test for sustaining declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 9 The abrogation of
the Federal Circuit's test, as later interpreted in that circuit,
expands declaratory judgment jurisdiction so that a mere difference of opinion between a putative licensor and licensee as to
whether a license is needed appears to satisfy the jurisdictional
prerequisites to obtaining declaratory judgment relief. 10
This Note analyzes the impact the MedImmune decision
has on patent licensing activity and suggests how to mitigate
the chilling effect the decision has had on such activity. Part I
explores the history, policy, and development of law surrounding patent licensing and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA).1 1
Part II explains the impact of the MedImmune decision as interpreted by the Federal Circuit and argues in favor of restricting access to declaratory judgment relief. Finally, Part III argues that district courts should discretionarily forego accepting
declaratory judgment actions in certain licensing situations.
This Note concludes that discretion should be expanded to capture the practical realities that are involved in the patent licensing and negotiation process.

6. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777.
7. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring) (discussing the
change in Federal Circuit law mandated by the MedImmune decision).
8. See id. at 1377-81 (majority opinion) (recognizing that the Supreme
Court opinion in MedImmune represented a rejection of the prior Federal Circuit reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test).
9. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774-75 n.ll.
10. See, e.g., SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381 ("[W]here a patentee asserts
rights under a patent based on certain identified ongoing or planned activity of
another party, and where that party contends that it has the right to engage
in the accused activity without license, an Article III case or controversy will
arise .

11.

. ").

28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
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I. PATENT LICENSING AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Declaratory judgment is a procedural mechanism that allows a party uncertain of her legal rights to obtain official adjudication of her legal position. 12 Part I introduces the history
and judicial interpretation of the DJA. Then, Part I describes
the unique application of the DJA to patent licensing and patent disputes. Part I concludes by detailing the MedImmune
ruling and the Federal Circuit's response to the decision.
A. REMOVING UNCERTAINTY: THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
ACT

Before the enactment of the DJA, patentees possessed tremendous power to choose the time, place, and manner in which
to file patent infringement suits.

13

The asymmetric power be-

tween patentees and alleged infringers allowed threats of enforcement to incapacitate alleged infringers, placing them under a cloud of uncertainty without any mechanism for clarifying
their legal relationships. 14 A patentee could use threats and
coercion to intimidate a competitor's customers and dealers, often forcing settlements without risking adjudication of possibly
15
unenforceable claims.
By 1934, Congress recognized the undesirable effects that
patentees' powers had on potential infringers and provided a
judicial mechanism by which nonpatentees could test patent
noninfringement and invalidity positions. 16 Congress passed

12.

EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 25-27 (2d ed. 1941).

13. See Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731,
734-35 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (describing the "sad and saddening scenario that led
to enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act" in which "a patent owner engages in a danse macabre, brandishing a Damoclean threat with a sheathed
sword").
14. See Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Before the Declaratory Judgment Act, competitors victimized by scare-the-customer-and-run tactics were rendered helpless and
immobile so long as the patent owner refused to grasp the nettle and sue."
(quoting Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 735) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Zenie Bros. v. Miskend, 10 F. Supp. 779, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) ("It is said that a
suit by a private party who has no patent himself to declare a competitor's patent void is without precedent. The charge is true.").
15. BORCHARD, supra note 12, at 803-04.
16. The congressional record accompanying passage of the DJA is sparse;
Professor Lisa Dolak, however, has provided a succinct synopsis of the relevant history. Lisa A. Dolak, DeclaratoryJudgment Jurisdictionin Patent Cases: Restoring the Balance Between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 38
B.C. L. REV. 903, 910 & n.51, 911 (1997).
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the DJA,17 which provides that "[iun a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States...

may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration."1 8 The Act effectively allows
a party uncertain of her legal rights to plead affirmative defenses prior to the commencement of an infringement suit by
the patentee. 19
The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the
DJA in the first years after its passage, further holding that
the Act is a procedural tool wherein the actual-controversy requirement is limited only by the "case or controversy" requirements of Article 111.20 The Court later interpreted the plain
language of the Act to include discretionary grounds for refus21
ing to grant jurisdiction.
22
While patents have a statutory presumption of validity,
countervailing considerations of settling expectations and removing the in terrorem effects of threatened litigation are important to the public at large. 2 3 The DJA addresses this public
interest by allowing a party uncertain of her legal rights to confirm noninfringement positions or to challenge the validity of a
patent that may be, in the words of Judge Learned Hand, nothing more than a "scarecrow." 24 Despite the power of declaratory
judgment to settle legal uncertainty, courts do not have unlimited jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment claims.

17. Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955-56 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2000)).
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202.

19. See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 974-75 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The primary difference between [the defendant's] action and the infringement suit that

would formerly have been required for an adjudication of validity is that the
parties' positions here have been inverted .... ).
20. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937) ("The
Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to 'cases of actual controversy,' manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision and is operative
only in respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional sense. The
word 'actual' is one of emphasis rather than of definition. Thus the operation
of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only.").
21. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241 (1952).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
23. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100-03
(1993).
24. See Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943).
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B. "ACTUAL CONTROVERSY" AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S TwoPRONG INQUIRY FOR ASSERTING DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
JURISDICTION
Shortly after the passage of the DJA, the Supreme Court
articulated a broad-based inquiry for determining whether an
actual controversy exists sufficient to sustain declaratory
judgment jurisdiction. 25 The Court stated that the question is
"whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show
that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." 26 The Court
also warned that application of the procedural tool involves an
intensely factual inquiry that does not lend itself to a precise
27
test.
Despite this warning, the Federal Circuit created a twopart declaratory judgment test to address the actualcontroversy aspect of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 28 The
inquiry was two-fold: First, did the defendant engage in conduct that created a "reasonable apprehension" such that the
plaintiff will face an infringement suit if it commences or continues a particular activity?29 Second, did the plaintiff seeking
a declaration of invalidity or noninfringement actually com30
mence or prepare to commence an allegedly infringing act?
At least one commentator has criticized the accuracy of the
test for erroneously focusing on whether a patentee's conduct
evidenced intent to imminently commence a lawsuit instead of
whether an imminent controversy (i.e., allegations of infringement) existed. 3 1 Moreover, the predictability of the declaratory
judgment jurisdiction remained variable because the actualcontroversy requirement was just one prong of the DJA.32 The
DJA contains a discretionary component, and the Act "created
25. Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 272-73 (1941).
26. Id. at 273.
27. See id. ('The difference between an abstract question and a 'controversy' contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a precise test
for determining in every case whether there is such a controversy.").
28. See Jervis B. Webb Co. v. S. Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1398-99 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (employing a two-part inquiry before sustaining declaratory judgment jurisdiction).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Dolak, supra note 16, at 908.
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
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an opportunity, rather than a duty," to grant jurisdiction to
33
qualifying litigants.
The Federal Circuit's declaratory judgment jurisprudence
prior to MedImmune thus consisted of two levels of inquiry.
First, the court inquired whether Article III jurisdiction existed
based on the aforementioned two-part test. 34 If jurisdiction existed, the court then performed the second inquiry to determine
whether the discretionary aspect of the DJA militated against
asserting jurisdiction over the action. 35 While the two levels of
inquiry appear to be a simple division, the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence has been inconsistent in distinguishing between
jurisdictional considerations and discretionary policy consider36
ations.
C. LIMITATIONS ON THE DISCRETIONARY APPLICATION OF THE
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
The DJA does not afford district courts unlimited discretion in turning away declaratory judgment actions.3 7 The Federal Circuit may reverse a lower court's decision not to hear a
declaratory judgment action on discretionary grounds when the
court's decision was clearly unreasonable or arbitrary, the decision was based on erroneous findings or an erroneous conclusion of law, or when the record contains no evidence upon
38
which the court could rationally have based its decision.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has made clear that the
Act affords courts a "unique and substantial discretion" to declare the rights of litigants. 39 "Exceptional circumstances" are
33. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995).
34. See Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 634 (Fed. Cir.
1991) ("When there is no actual controversy, the court has no discretion to decide the case.").
35. See, e.g., id. ('When there is an actual controversy and thus jurisdiction, the exercise of that jurisdiction is discretionary.").
36. See Lisa A. Dolak, Power or Prudence: Toward a Better Standard for
Evaluating Patent Litigants' Access to the Declaratory Judgment Remedy, 41
U.S.F. L. REV. 407, 419 (2007).
37. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 95 n.17
(1993) ("[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act affords the district court some discretion in determining whether or not to exercise that jurisdiction .
(emphasis added)).
38. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
39. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995) ("Since its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act has been understood to confer on federal
courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the
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not required to exercise this discretion. 40 The Supreme Court
has further affirmed this broad commitment to discretion by
holding that appellate courts must review district courts' decisions not to entertain declaratory judgment actions on discre41
tionary grounds for abuse of discretion rather than de novo.
While neither the Supreme Court 42 nor the Federal Cir-

cuit 43 has delineated the outer boundaries of the discretion af-

forded by the DJA, one of the co-drafters of the Act, Edwin Borchard, has suggested several factors that militate against the
exercise of discretion. 44 Borchard suggested that courts render
declaratory judgment when the judgment clarifies and settles
the legal relations at issue or when it affords relief from the
uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceedings. 4 5 These issues frequently arise in the patent licensorlicensee relationship.
D. LICENSOR-LICENSEE RELATIONSHIPS IN THE PATENT
CONTEXT

Evaluating declaratory judgment actions between patent
licensors and licensees is difficult because competing policy

46
considerations exist between patent law and contract law.

Prior to the 1969 Supreme Court decision of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 47 licensee estoppel prevented a patent licensee from raising patent invalidity as a defense in a suit for royalties under a

rights of litigants."); see also Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237,
241 (1952) ("This is an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts

rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.").
40. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286-88.
41. See id. at 289 ("We believe it more consistent with the statute to vest
district courts with discretion in the first instance, because facts bearing on
the usefulness of the declaratory judgment remedy, and the fitness of the case
for resolution, are peculiarly within their grasp.").
42. See id. at 290 ("We do not attempt at this time to delineate the outer
boundaries of that discretion in other cases ...").
43. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelecs., Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2007) ("We need not define the outer boundaries of declaratory judgment jurisdiction ...").
44. BORCHARD, supra note 12, at 299.
45. Id.
46. Lear, Inc. y. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969). A tension exists because contract law r'forbids a purchaser to repudiate his promises simply because he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargain he has made," yet federal
law "requires that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common
good unless they are protected by a valid patent." Id.
47. Id. at 653.
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license agreement. 48 The doctrine of licensee estoppel, however,
was abolished in Lear in favor of countervailing public policy
interests in testing the validity of patents. 49 The Court determined that enforcing contractual provisions limiting a licensee's power to sue would unduly undermine a "strong federal
policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public domain."50
In view of the public policy principles embodied in Lear,
the Federal Circuit initially took the position that a declaratory
judgment action is not precluded between a patent licensor and
licensee just because the patent license is still effective. 5 1 The
Federal Circuit reined in the broad reading of Lear, however, as
the court later determined that not every licensee in every circumstance had the right to challenge the validity of the licensed patent. 52 The Federal Circuit continued to limit Lear by
prohibiting a licensee from invoking the Lear doctrine until it
actually ceased royalty payments and provided notice to the licensor that the reason for ceasing payment of royalties was be53
cause it doubted the validity of the patent claim.
Finally, in Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that a nonrepudiating licensee in good standing was

48. See Idaho Potato Comm'n v. M&M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d
130, 135 (2d Cir. 2003) ("The general rule of licensee estoppel provides that
when a licensee enters into an agreement to use the intellectual property of a
licensor, the licensee effectively recognizes the validity of that property and is
estopped from contesting its validity in future disputes.").
49. Lear, 395 U.S. at 670 ("[T]he equities of the licensor do not weigh very
heavily when they are balanced against the important public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part
of the public domain.").
50. Id. at 674.
51. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 880 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("To
always require the termination of a license agreement as a precondition to suit
would mean that a licensee must then bear the risk of liability of infringement. This would discourage licensees from contesting patent validity and
would be contrary to the policies expressed in Lear.").
52. See, e.g., Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Studiengesellschaft Kohle M.B.H. v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561,
1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 476-77
(Fed. Cir. 1991); Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978,
991-93 (Fed. Cir. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds by A.C. Aukerman
Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Hemstreet v.
Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 350-51 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Diamond Scientific Co. v.
Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224-26 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
53. Studiengesellschaft, 112 F.3d at 1568.
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54
estopped from bringing a declaratory judgment action. The
court reasoned that until a licensee placed herself in material
breach of the licensing contract, there was no actual controversy to sustain declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 55 Relying on
policies of contract law and the value of the patent system in
fostering technology exchange, the court stated that the licensor "voluntarily relinquished its statutory right to exclude by
granting [the licensee] a nonexclusive license." 56 Allowing the
action to proceed would defeat those contractual covenants and
discourage patentees from granting licenses because "the licensor would bear all the risk, while licensee would benefit from
the license's effective cap on damages or royalties 57in the event
its challenge to the patent's scope or validity fails."
While some viewed the Gen-Probe decision as an impermissible retreat from the principles embodied in Lear, other patent practitioners viewed the Gen-Probe rule, which encouraged
patent litigation settlement through licensing, as a favorable
58
alternative to costly and risky patent litigation.

E. PATENT LICENSES AND THE DISCRETIONARY APPLICATION OF
THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
Courts have historically viewed a patentee's offer of a license to a possible infringer, without more, as insufficient to
confer declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 59 An express charge of
patent infringement has never been required to sustain declaratory judgment jurisdiction, 60 but a patentee merely proposing
54. 359 F.3d 1376, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 2004), abrogated by MedImmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).

55.
56.
57.
58.
lenges

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1382.
See Erik Belt & Keith Toms, The Price of Admission: Licensee Chalto Patents After MedImmune v. Genentech, BOSTON B.J., May-June

2007, at 10, 11.

59. See, e.g., EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 809 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (affirming the lower court's decision not to exercise declaratory judgment jurisdiction on discretionary grounds because there were "active license
or sale negotiations"), abrogated by MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. 764; Indium Corp.
of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussing the

lack of reasonable apprehension that allegedly resulted from Indium Corp.'s
president sending a letter to Semi-Alloys, Inc. inviting a licensing discussion).
60. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 888 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (stating that an express charge of infringement is not required for an
actual controversy to. arise); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc.,

824 F.2d 953, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[W]e cannot read the Declaratory Judgment Act so narrowly as to require that a party actually be confronted with an
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or entering into licensing negotiations typically would not find
itself subject to declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 61 In fact, the
Federal Circuit prior to MedImmune made clear that the pendency of serious negotiations to license or sell a patent may be
taken into account when considering the discretionary exercise
62
of declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
Despite this freedom to negotiate licenses, the Federal Circuit has recognized that the possibility of a lawsuit always exists during licensing and that "[the threat of enforcement... is
the entire source of the patentee's bargaining power." 63 To balance this threat, courts have looked closely at the language of
licensing negotiations before sustaining declaratory judgment
jurisdiction, going so far as to conclude that statements that
another party's activities "fall within" a patent claim may reflect a reason for initiating licensing negotiations, but "in the
context of the parties' licensing negotiations can hardly be con64
sidered an express charge of infringement."
Courts have also recognized that improvidently granted jurisdiction may decrease the market value of the defendant's patents and improve the bargaining position of the plaintiff. 65 In
this context, the exercise of declaratory judgment jurisdiction
may create an incentive structure that is inconsistent with the
public interest in preserving declaratory proceedings for cases
closer to the central objectives of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 66 Moreover, from a tactical perspective, courts recognize
express threat of litigation to meet the requirements of an actual case or controversy."), abrogatedby MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. 764.
61. See, e.g., Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha,
57 F.3d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
62. See, e.g., EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 812-14 (affirming the lower court's
decision not to exercise declaratory judgment jurisdiction because there were
continuing negotiations).
63. Id. at 811. The court further recognized that "it is unrealistic to suggest that some negotiating patentees intend to enforce their patents while
some do not, and that the first group is subject to declaratory judgment actions while the second is not." Id.
64. Shell Oil, 970 F.2d at 888. But see EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 811-12
("The need to look to substance rather than form is especially important in
this area ....
[The] inquiry does not turn on whether the parties have used
particular 'magic words' in communicating with one another.").
65. See, e.g., EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 814 (discussing the district court's decision not to sustain declaratory judgment jurisdiction on discretionary
grounds because of the adverse incentives that would be created).
66. The declaratory judgment device serves multiple purposes, BORCHARD, supra note 12, at 292, but the core objectives are to settle disputed legal relations and to afford relief from genuine uncertainty, insecurity, and con-
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that allowing licensees in good standing to bring invalidity
suits against the predicate patents dramatically shifts the
risks-and hence the bargaining positions-in the licensor67
licensee relationship.
Before sustaining declaratory judgment jurisdiction, a
court must balance the competing policy considerations of limited judicial resources with the right of a party threatened
with legal action to obtain an early adjudication of its rights
and liabilities. 68 As the Federal Circuit noted in Shell Oil Co. v.
Amoco Corp., "[tihe Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to
protect threatened parties, not to drag a nonthreatening paten69
tee into court."
F.

CHANGING THE RULES: MEDIMMUNE V. GENENTECHAND ITS

PROGENY
After years of applying a standard declaratory judgment
test, the Supreme Court recently abrogated the Federal Circuit's two-part jurisdictional test. In MedImmune, the Supreme
Court held that a nonrepudiating patent licensee is not per se
estopped from bringing a declaratory judgment action based on
70
the lack of an actual controversy.
The MedImmune dispute arose from a 1997 licensing
71
agreement entered into between MedImmune and Genentech.
The agreement granted licenses to MedImmune under Genentech's Cabilly I patent 72 as well as its then-pending Cabilly II

troversy, id. at 279, 299. In patent disputes, declaratory judgment prevents a
patentee from making threats and coercive charges without actually bringing
suit by allowing a potential infringer to initiate suit against the patentee. See
id. at 803-04.
67. See Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(stating that if licensees in good standing were allowed to sue, then "the licensor would bear all the risk, while [the] licensee would benefit from the license's
effective cap on damages or royalties in the event its challenge to the patent's
scope or validity fails."), abrogated by MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
68. See, e.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673
(Fed. Cir. 1991) ("This case involves the competing policy considerations of, on
the one hand, conserving limited judicial resources by declining jurisdiction
and, on the other hand, utilizing the services of a court by permitting a party
threatened with legal action to obtain an early adjudication of its rights and
liabilities.").
69. 970 F.2d at 889.
70. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777.
71. Id. at 767-68.
72. U.S. Patent No. 4,816,567 (filed Apr. 8, 1983).
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patent application. 73 After Genentech's Cabilly II patent application matured into an issued patent, 74 Genentech advised
MedImmune that its Synagis product fell under Cabilly II's
claims. 75 Genentech further demanded royalty payments on
MedImmune's Synagis product. 76 MedImmune believed the Cabilly II patent to be invalid and unenforceable, but it was unwilling to risk treble damages for willful infringement 77 or
worse, being enjoined from selling the Synagis product, which
accounted for more than eighty percent of its revenue. 78 MedImmune proceeded to pay the demanded royalties "under pro79
test."
MedImmune subsequently sought declaratory judgment relief, but the district court relied on the Federal Circuit's holding
in Gen-Probe80 to rule that a licensee in good standing could not
establish an Article III case or controversy.8 1 The Federal Cir82
cuit affirmed the district court's ruling.
The Supreme Court was thus presented with the specific
question of whether the actual-controversy requirement of the
DJA83 required a patent licensee to stop making royalty payments-thereby committing a material breach of its licensing
agreement-before being allowed to bring a declaratory judgment suit.8 4 The Court answered that a licensee is not required
to breach her licensing agreement before challenging the patent
underlying the agreement as invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.8 5 In reaching its decision, the Court noted the magnitude of the risk for MedImmune8 6 as well as the fact that Med-

73. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 768; MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
427 F.3d 958, 961-62 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 764.
74. U.S. Patent No. 6,331,415 (filed June 10, 1988).
75. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 768.
76. Id.
77. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
78. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 768.
79. Id.
80. Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004), abrogated by MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. 764.
81. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 768.
82. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 969 (Fed. Cir.
2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 764.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
84. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777.

85. Id.
86. Id. at 775 ("The rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet
the farm, or (as here) risk treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its
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8 7
Immune was "coerced" into the threat-eliminating agreement.
The Court further rejected Genentech's argument that the
promise to pay royalties in the license agreement contained an
88
implied covenant not to challenge the validity of the patent.
In reaching its decision, the Court rearticulated the standard from Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. 8 9 for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction 90 and sharply criticized the
Federal Circuit's two-part reasonable-apprehension test. 91
Upon remanding the case, the Court left the "equitable, prudential, and policy arguments" favoring discretionary dismissal
"for the lower courts' consideration. 9 2
The MedImmune decision will undoubtedly change licensing behavior. Some practitioners suggest that putative patent
infringers will strategically accept a "coerced" license to avoid
the treble damages associated with willful patent infringement 93 and preserve the right to bring a declaratory judgment
action. 94 Others believe that MedImmune will change the way
patent licenses are drafted and may increase licensing costs by
incorporating risk premiums into the license for potential legal
costs if validity or enforceability is later challenged. 95 Still others predict a bifurcated reaction: less predictability in declaratory judgment actions may make some potential infringers
more inclined to litigate rather than accept royalty demands,

business, before seeking a declaration of its actively contested legal rights
finds no support in Article III.").
87. Id. at 772, 775 n.12 (noting that subject-matter jurisdiction is not
precluded when the threat-eliminating behavior was effectively coerced).
88. Id. at 776.
89. 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
90. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 771 ('Basically, the question in each case is
whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment."' (quoting Md. Cas., 312 U.S. at 273)).
91. Id. at 774 n.11 ("The [Federal Circuit's] reasonable-apprehension-ofsuit test also conflicts with our decisions ... .
92. Id. at 777.
93. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
94. See Sean M. O'Connor, Using Stock and Stock Options to Minimize
Patent Royalty Payment Risks After MedImmune v. Genentech, 3 N.Y.U. J. L.
& Bus. 381, 438-39 (2007).
95. Bryan C. Diner & Ali Ahmed, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett
& Dunner, L.L.P., United States: In the Aftermath of Med[Ilmmune v. Genentech, Is It All Doom and Gloom for Licensors or Are There Rays of Hope in the
Future?, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, July 8, 2007, http://www.mondaq.com/
article.asp?article-id=49852&print= 1.
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while others may be unable to justify the costs
and risks of liti96
gation and will forego business opportunities.
Regardless of these predictions, the effect of MedImmune
was apparent in the Federal Circuit's March 2007 decision in
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.97 In the dispute lead-

ing up to the declaratory judgment action, STMicroelectronics
(STM) engaged SanDisk in a series of discussions regarding potential licensing or cross-licensing agreements. 98 STM presented SanDisk with an infringement analysis during the discussions identifying how specific claims of STM's patents were
infringed by SanDisk's products. 99 However, STM also gave a
verbal promise that it had "absolutely no plan whatsoever to
sue SanDisk."'100 When SanDisk subsequently brought a declaratory judgment action against STM, the district court-relying
on the Federal Circuit's old two-part reasonable-apprehension
test-granted summary judgment in favor of STM.101
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of the declaratory judgment action. 10 2 The Federal
Circuit recognized that MedImmune rejected its two-part reasonable-apprehension test.10 3 The court further articulated a
new standard for sustaining declaratory judgment jurisdiction:
"where a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain identified ongoing or planned activity of another party,
and where that party contends that it has the right to engage
in the accused activity without license, an Article III case or
controversy will arise."104 The breadth of this new standard is a
"sweeping change," and Judge William Bryson's concurring
opinion fully recognized the potential for this new standard to
infect licensing negotiations. 05 Judge Bryson noted that "under
the court's standard virtually any invitation to take a paid license relating to the prospective licensee's activities would give
10 6
rise to an Article III case or controversy."'

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Dolak, supra note 36, at 433-34.
480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1374-76.
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1376.
Id. at 1376-77.
Id. at 1383.
Id. at 1380.
Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring).
Id. at 1384.
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The Federal Circuit's broad new standard appears ready to
inject litigation into almost all patent licensing relationships. If
the discretionary rejection of declaratory judgment jurisdiction
is the only tool remaining to save patent licensing, the contours
of how courts should conduct their post-MedImmune discretionary analyses remain unclear.
II. PATENT LICENSING IN THE WAKE OF MEDIMMUNE
Part I described the DJA and its application to patent licensing disputes. Part II evaluates the Federal Circuit's response to MedImmune and discusses rationales for restricting
access to declaratory judgment jurisdiction. In particular, Part
II identifies special patent licensing considerations that militate against broad application of declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
A. APPLYING MEDIMMUNE IN THE LICENSING CONTEXT

In a single footnote, MedImmune abrogated the Federal
Circuit's reasonable-apprehension test for declaratory judgment jurisdiction, replacing a semipredictable jurisdictional
standard with uncertainty. 10 7 The Federal Circuit, in subsequent applications of MedImmune, has neither limited the decision to its facts (i.e., declaratory judgment actions between
parties to an existing license agreement) nor ameliorated the
decision's harsh effect by retaining some of the strictures of its
prior jurisprudence.10 8 Instead, the Federal Circuit has extended the full impact of MedImmune to preliminary licensing
negotiations 09 and nonlicensing relationships. 110 The practical
problems that MedImmune and its progeny now pose for a patentee seeking to license her invention are two-fold. First, a patentee's mere offer to license her technology can subject her to
declaratory judgment jurisdiction and the burdens of defending
her patent. Second, even if a licensing agreement is consum107. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 774 n.11
(2007).

108. See, e.g., SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1380-81 (articulating a new declaratory judgment standard for preliminary licensing negotiations while noting that
the Supreme Court addressed declaratory judgment jurisdiction in the context
of a signed license).
109. See Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271,
1289-90 (Fed. Cir. 2007); SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381.
110. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d
1330, 1337-40 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (extending declaratory judgment jurisdiction
beyond the one patent charged in a then-pending suit to cover more patents).

2008]

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

1981

mated, a licensee can challenge the validity of the underlying
patent without repudiating her license to the extent that the
license was "coerced." A patentee may be able to mitigate the
latter problem through contracting procedures,1 1 1 but the former problem remains a dangerous and lingering hazard to a
patentee's attempts to license her technology.
The extended problem with preliminary licensing overtures
is that an offer to take a license generally carries with it at
least an implied assertion of infringement, 112 and after SanDisk, a mere difference of opinion between a putative licensor
and licensee as to whether a license is needed appears to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites for obtaining declaratory
judgment relief. 113 The recent treatment of declaratory judgment jurisdiction, however, does not appear to be compelled by
Supreme Court precedent.
1. The Federal Circuit's Jurisdictional Treatment of the
Declaratory Judgment Act After MedImmune
The trouble with the Federal Circuit's broad SanDisk
standard for obtaining declaratory judgment jurisdiction (i.e.,
satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of Article 111)114 is
that the standard is not compelled by MedImmune nor entirely
consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence. The MedIm111. See, e.g., John W. Schlicher, Patent Licensing, What to Do After Medimmune v. Genentech, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 364, 367 (2007)
(noting that MedImmune should have no impact on licensing agreements that
define royalty obligations without reference to validity); Diner & Ahmed, supra note 95, at 5 (suggesting that licensors can add a provision allowing them
to terminate the license if the licensee challenges the predicate patent).
112. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1384 (Bryson, J., concurring) (stating that
underlying a license offer is an express or implied suggestion that the other
party's conduct falls within the scope of the patent); EMC Corp. v. Norand
Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the threat of enforcement
is the source of a patentee's bargaining power during licensing negotiations),
abrogated by MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. 764.
113. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381 (majority opinion). It is important to
note that different formulations for declaratory judgment jurisdiction appear
to have emerged between panels of the Federal Circuit. Compare id. ("[W]here
a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain identified ongoing or
planned activity of another party, and where that party contends that it has
the right to engage in the accused activity without license, an Article III case
or controversy will arise .... "), and Sony, 497 F.3d at 1286 (same), with Teva
Pharms., 482 F.3d at 1337 (stating that declaratory judgment requires a showing that an Article III controversy exists, which is determined based on con-cepts of standing and ripeness).
114. The operation of the DJA is procedural only, and limited only by the
Constitution. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937).
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mune Court, while deciding declaratory judgment jurisdiction
in the context of an existing license, spoke of declaratory judgment relief in the context of "imminent threat of harm,"115
"bet[ting] the farm," 1 16 "[tihe coercion principle,"' 117 and ultimately as "an alternative to pursuit of ... arguably illegal activity."'118 The vocabulary and import of MedImmune is consistent with previous Supreme Court cases requiring a legal
dispute to be "definite and concrete" and "real and substantial"
before declaratory judgment jurisdiction could attach. 119 Even
the Supreme Court's Maryland Casualty standard, which was
rearticulated in MedImmune and cited approvingly in SanDisk,
requires a "substantial controversy" of "sufficient immediacy
and reality" before declaratory judgment jurisdiction is available.

12 0

The broad SanDisk standard, by contrast, appears to place
declaratory judgment jurisdiction at the option of the potential
licensee without inquiring how definite, immediate, concrete, or
substantial the purported legal dispute is. 12 1 As Judge Bryson

acknowledged in his concurring opinion, the new rule offers "no
practical stopping point short of allowing declaratory judgment
actions in virtually any case in which the recipient of an invitation to take a patent license elects to dispute the need for a license." 122 The problem with the SanDisk standard is that the
"difference between an abstract question and a 'controversy'
contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily
one of degree." 123 A jurisdictional standard where "virtually any
invitation to take a paid license relating to the prospective licensee's activities [gives] rise to an Article III case or controversy" 24 is inconsistent with the broader factual inquiry requiring a finding of a substantial controversy of sufficient
immediacy and reality before declaratory judgment jurisdiction
can be sustained.125
115. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 772.
116. Id. at 775.
117. Id. at 775 n.12.
118. Id. at 772 (citation omitted).
119. Aetna Life Ins., 300 U.S. at 240-41.
120. Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
121. See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelecs., Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (describing the jurisdiction standard).
122. Id. at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring).
123. Md. Cas., 312 U.S. at 273.
124. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1384 (Bryson, J., concurring).
125. See Md. Cas., 312 U.S. at 273.
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2. The Federal Circuit's Review of Declaratory Judgment Act
Decisions After MedImmune
The broad discretion afforded by the DJA was reaffirmed
in MedImmune, where the Court expressly left the "equitable,
prudential, and policy arguments in favor of... discretionary
dismissal for the lower courts' consideration on remand."'126
Discretion is arguably a useful tool for mitigating MedImmune's adverse effects on licensing efforts. However, the Federal Circuit's limited treatment of discretion after MedImmune
has not countenanced broad discretion. 127
For example, in Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Guardian Media
Technologies, Ltd., the Federal Circuit reversed a district
court's discretionary refusal to accept declaratory judgment jurisdiction where the district court concluded that "the facts as a
whole create[d] an appearance that Plaintiffs filed these lawsuits as an intimidation tactic to gain leverage in the licensing
negotiations."'128 The court distinguished a pre-MedImmune decision with a similar factual predicate sustaining a district
court's discretionary refusal to entertain declaratory judgment
jurisdiction. 29 In that case, the district court discretionarily refused declaratory judgment jurisdiction when it concluded that
"a party in [the plaintiff's] position could abuse the declaratory
judgment device to obtain a more favorable bargaining position
in its ongoing negotiations with the patentee."' 30 The Sony
court found that its case, unlike the prior case, lacked "affirmative evidence" that the plaintiffs filed suit "to obtain a more favorable bargaining position in any ongoing license negotiations."131
What is surprising about the Sony court's decision is not
that the court reached its decision after reviewing the district
court's dismissal of jurisdiction under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard, 132 nor that it imposed a heighted "affirma126. 127 S. Ct. 764, 776-77 (2007) (citing Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515
U.S. 277, 286 (1995)).

127. See, e.g., Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d
1271, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (suggesting that district courts should not discretionarily deny declaratory judgment jurisdiction, even if they conclude that a
suit was tactically filed to improve a party's negotiating position).
128. Id. at 1281 (citation omitted).
129. See EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 814 (Fed. Cir. 1996), abrogated by MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. 764.
130. Id.
131. Sony, 497 F.3d at 1289.
132. Id. at 1288.
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tive evidence" standard. 133 Instead, what is surprising about
the decision is the broader dicta implying hostility toward discretionary dismissal of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that
"[e]ven if these suits have had the effect of placing appellants in
effect is not a suffia more favorable negotiating position, that
134
cient reason to decline to hear the suit."

These remarks are similar to the Federal Circuit's remarks
in SanDisk13 5 There, the court chose not to reaffirm the unique
and substantial discretion afforded to district courts by the
DJA.136 Instead, the court went out of its way to remind district
courts that their discretion has limits; the court noted that
"there are boundaries to that discretion,"137 and "in the usual
circumstance the declaratory judgment is not subject to dismissal." 138
Despite the apparent newfound hostility towards discretion
in the declaratory judgment context, compelling arguments still
exist for restricting declaratory judgment relief.
B. RATIONALE FOR RESTRICTING ACCESS TO DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT RELIEF

MedImmune and its progeny have unquestionably lowered
the requirements for qualifying for declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Based on this significant change in law, it is useful to
inquire what, if any, contrarian rationales exist for maintaining
restrictive declaratory judgment relief.
To begin, it is appropriate to acknowledge that declaratory
judgment relief is a powerful remedy that is usefully exercised
in many circumstances. For example, declaratory judgment can
provide an opportunity for early adjudication of an issue, potentially preventing economic waste and useless expenditure of
money in a lengthy trial.139 Likewise, declaratory judgment relief is productively exercised when core purposes of the DJA are
implicated, such as when a plaintiff is assailed by uncertainty
or insecurity over her legal rights and needs an authoritative
adjudication of her rights before risking action.1 40 When these
133. Id. at 1289.
134.

Id.

135. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelecs., Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
136. See id. at 1383 (describing the jurisdiction standards under the DJA).
137. Id.
138. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
139. BORCHARD, supra note 12, at 807.
140. See id. at 931.
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purposes of declaratory judgment are considered in light of
Lear's pronouncement of a strong public policy favoring testing
patents for invalidity, 14 ' broad application of the declaratory
judgment remedy would seem particularly germane in the patent context. Despite these strong arguments, countervailing
considerations justify restricting access to the declaratory
judgment remedy in many circumstances.
A judicial policy that the public be allowed to challenge patents that may be invalid holds little sway when considering
the congressional command that issued patents are presumptively valid. 142 Subjecting patents to easy challenge tends to
undermine and impair the presumptive strengths given to patents by Congress. 143 Moreover, allowing patents to be easily
challenged diminishes the national patent system by reducing
the ex ante expected value of a patent. 144 Reducing the value of
a patent will encourage some inventors to forego patent protection and prevent disclosure of their acquired knowledge in the
145
public domain.
Restricted access to declaratory judgment relief is also
beneficial because it encourages adversaries to divert resources
away from litigation and toward more socially beneficial efforts.
For example, encouraging a competitor's efforts to design
around a patentee's patented product-instead of challenging
the patent in court-advantages the public and promotes the
useful arts. 146 Furthermore, limiting access to the declaratory
141. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
142. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
143. Cf. In re McKellin, 529 F.2d 1324, 1333 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Markey, C.J.,
concurring) ("There being no common law of patents, we should take care to
fill the Holmesian interstices of the statute with judge-made law only under
the gravest and most impelling circumstances.").
144. Cf. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
150-51 (1989) (noting that the patent system embodies a carefully crafted
bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new advances in technology that is rewarded with an exclusive right to practice the invention for a
period of years). But see Maverick Boat Co. v. Am. Marine Holdings, Inc., 418
F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that Congress passed the Vessel Hull
Design Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000)), in response to Bonito Boats to provide
copyright protection to the owners of certain vessel hull designs).
145. See William Krause, Sweeping the E-Commerce Patent Minefield: The
Need for a Workable Business Method Exception, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 79,
93-95 (2000) (discussing the costs and benefits of patent protection for software-based innovations).
146. See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457
(Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Designing around patents is, in fact, one of the ways in
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judgment remedy encourages negotiated resolution of disputes,
potentially resulting in less disruptive, less costly, and more
14 7
amicable conclusions to disputes.

Likewise, restrictive declaratory judgment jurisdiction may
be beneficial where a party's anticipated conduct has not fully

developed. If a product could undergo alterations before reaching the marketplace-alterations that may be critical to questions of infringement-it is potentially impossible to accurately
148
adjudicate noninfringement claims.
All the aforementioned situations are exemplars of the
benefits of restricting access to declaratory judgment relief. A
broader rationale for discretionarily foregoing declaratory
judgment jurisdiction rests in considerations of judicial economy and the allocation of judicial resources. 149 The systemic
danger of investing resources on wasted effort provides an
overarching policy justification for restricting declaratory
150
judgment relief.
C. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE LICENSOR-LICENSEE
CONTEXT
Special considerations exist for restricting declaratory
judgment access in the patent licensing context. Before Med-

Immune, a patentee-licensor could manage her risk of declaratory judgment action by restricting her communications and interactions with a potential licensee. 15 1 The Federal Circuit's
which the patent system works to the advantage of the public in promoting
progress in the useful arts, its constitutional purpose.").
147. See Daniel Ciraco, Forget the Mechanics and Bring in the Gardeners,9
U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 47, 52-57 (2000) (characterizing intellectual property disputes and discussing alternative dispute resolution strategies).
148. Many claimants, however, seek a determination on questions of invalidity or enforceability that do not require a comparison to specific products.
See Dolak, supra note 36, at 436.
149. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 672 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
150. See Serco Servs. Co. v. Kelley Co., 51 F.3d 1037, 1039-40 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (affirming the dismissal of a first-filed declaratory judgment action in
favor of a patent infringement action filed three days later, where witness and
document availability and convenience favored the latter forum and the first
action was filed in anticipation of the patent suit); Cingular Wireless L.L.C. v.
Freedom Wireless, Inc., No. CV06-1935, 2007 WL 1876377, at *6 (D. Ariz.
June 27, 2007) (foregoing declaratory judgment jurisdiction where cases were
pending in a different jurisdiction).
151. See, e.g., Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha,
57 F.3d 1051, 1052-53 (Fed. Cir. 1995), abrogated by MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
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structured two-part reasonable-apprehension test resulted in
de facto restricted access to declaratory judgment relief and allowed a patentee to attempt to license her patent without being
subjected to the costs and burdens of litigation. Considering the
expense of patent litigation, 152 MedImmune's abrogation of the
reasonable-apprehension test exposes licensors to potentially
tremendous pecuniary burdens. Given the unique social benefits that flow from patent licensing activities, compelling rationales exist for restricting declaratory judgment relief in the
context of licensing overtures.
1.

Understanding How Licensors Operate: Dispelling Notions

To understand why it is desirous to encourage licensing activity, it is first necessary to understand who the typical licensors are and how they operate. Notions of the independent inventor, such as Henry Ford or the Wright Brothers, are largely
misplaced if not antedated in the modern economy. 153 In one
study, over eighty-five percent of patents surveyed were assigned from individual inventors to some type of corporate entity, and over seventy percent of patents were assigned to large
firms. 154 Based on these figures, the exclusive right to make,
use, or sel1 55 most patented technology resides in the hands of
discrete corporate entities.
Among large corporate intellectual property departments,
there are at least two different views on intellectual property
management. The first view is that the purpose and best use of
a firm's intellectual property portfolio is to protect its innovations from competitive attack. 15 6 This defensive posturing keeps
a firm's technology in-house yet allows it to trade patent rights
157
via cross-licensing and patent exchanges to settle disputes.
152. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 2, at 2 (citing AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP.
LAW ASSOC., supra note 2, at 22).
153. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An
Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2117

(2000).
154. See id. (describing the results from a study of one thousand patent
samples).
155. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
156. This largely defensive view generally opposes the idea that IP portfolios be used for any strategic purpose other than protecting the firm's innovations. PATRICK H. SULLIVAN, PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: ExTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION 104 (1998).

157. See Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual
Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 46-47
(2004); see also Bessen & Meurer, supra note 2, at 14-15 (discussing defensive
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The contrasting view is that a firm's intellectual property portfolio is a value-enhancing feature because of other firms' willingness to exploit the contents of the intellectual property
right. 158 These firms seek to actively market and license their
technology, and the technology may sit dormant in the hands of
159
the patent holder if there is no licensee for the technology.
Because a significant number of patents fall within one of
these two business models, it is necessary to incentivize licensing activity if the public is to reap the full benefits of the patent
system. Increased licensing activity by defensive patent holders
can represent a shift away from the portfolio-as-protection-only
160
view to the portfolio-as-corporate-revenue-generator view,
placing additional technology in the hands of a user. Similarly,
increased licensing activity in the latter business model can
place a stagnant asset in the hands of a user. The public benefits in either case because new technology and ideas are placed
in a broader domain.
The uncertainty that MedImmune injects into the licensing
community inhibits this important licensing activity. If licensing activities are dangerous to the licensor or the rights undefined to the licensee, transactions will be hampered because of
perceived risks. 161 Restricting declaratory judgment relief can
renew incentives to license by reducing the costs and risks associated with declaratory judgment action.
2.

The Information Disclosure Benefits of Licensing Activity

It has long been understood that the patent system's design and existence benefits the public.1 6 2 The public benefits
patent portfolios). But see James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent
Litigation Explosion 28 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 05-18,
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=831685 (concluding that the op-

timism about reduced litigation through defensive patenting is misplaced).
158. This perspective allows firms to maximize the value of their intellectual property, but it requires the firm to realize that it is no longer in the
technology-application manufacturing business but instead is in the technology-commercialization business. See SULLIVAN, supra note 156, at 105.
159. See Thomas C. Meyers, Field-of-Use Restrictions as Procompetitive
Elements in Patent and Know-How Licensing Agreements in the United States
and the European Communities, 12 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & BUs. 364, 372-73 (1991).
160. See SULLIVAN, supra note 156, at 104.
161.

See TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETS FOR KNOWLEDGE 53 (Bernard Guil-

hon ed., 2001).
162. See, e.g., Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1858) ("It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly granted to inventors was

never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the public
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because the patent system encourages the invention of new and
improved technology, disclosure of technology to the public, and
163
investment in the commercialization of patented ideas.
Among these various benefits, the disclosure feature of the patent system is one of the primary public benefits and rationales
for the existence of the patent system.
Disclosure is a predicate to obtaining a patent in the United States, and an inventor must disclose her invention sufficiently to enable others skilled in the art to make and use the
invention without undue experimentation. 1 64 The Supreme
Court has noted that the federal government is willing to pay a
high price for the disclosure of information because "disclosure,
it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances in the art."165 Despite
these disclosure requirements, significant effort can still be required to practice a patented invention. The "knowledge gap"
between what the patentee knows and what is disclosed in the
166
patent is frequently filled by the licensing system.
Patents and their associated licenses constitute channels
that allow knowledge to circulate among otherwise closed
firms.1 67 License agreements, in addition to transferring the
right to make, use, sell, or import a patented invention, may
require disclosure of private information about the patented invention that is retained by the patentee. The undisclosed complementary information (i.e., know-how) is disclosed through
the license purchase, which spreads knowledge in the economic

or community at large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting and securing that monopoly.").
163. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Nies, J., dissenting) ("[T]he patent system was established to provide certain
incentives for the conduct of activities critical to our economic and technological prosperity-the invention of new and improved technology, the disclosure
of this technology to the public, and the investment in its commercialization.").
164. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Auto. Tech. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am.,
Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac &
Ugine, 344 F. 3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
165. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
166. See John Dubiansky, The Role of Patents in Fostering Open Innovation, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 19,
66 (2006), http://www.vjolt.net/volll/issue4/
v1i4_a7-Dubiansky.pdf (describing the knowledge transfer that occurs with
active patent passive licensing).
167. See TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETS FOR KNOWLEDGE, supra note 161, at
13. Likewise, it is possible to "define markets for knowledge as places where
transactions for scientific and intangible assets occur." Id. at 11.
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system, 168 thus buttressing the information disclosure incentives the patent system provides.
3. Inventions Can Arise in the Hands of a Party That Is
Incapable of Fully Exploiting the Right
The patent system rewards invention, or "the practical implementation of the inventor's idea." 169 Innovation, by contrast,
is the "functional version of the invention," such as the version
first commercially offered for sale. 170 While innovation is only
rewarded indirectly through the patent system-which grants
patents on inventions-the development of commercialized
products is seen as one of the primary benefits of the patent
system. 17 1 Significant development work may be necessary,
however, to turn an invention into an innovation. 17 2 This distinction highlights how patent rights can "arise in the hands of
persons or firms who are not in the best position to exploit
them," leading to a useful discovery that is underexploited by
the public. 173 The inventor may not have the financial resources, technical know-how, or even desire to see her invention transformed into an innovation.
Similarly, when a patent covers a basic invention, the inventor can at most be expected to develop the basic technology
and some improvements thereon. 174 The discovery embodied in
the patent may be underdeveloped if the inventor is inhibited
175
from allowing others to develop potential improvements.
In order for the public to fully exploit a new invention, or to
have an invention turned into commercial innovation, an in168. See id. at 13-14.
169. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 805, 807 (1988).
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1575 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Nies, J., dissenting) (recognizing that investment in commercialization
is one of the activities the patent system seeks to incentivize).
172. See Merges, supra note 169, at 809.
173. Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic
Analysis ofIntellectual Property,53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1740 (2000).
174. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 873 (1990). Merges and Nelson suggest that "[tihe only way to find out what works and what does not is to let a
variety of minds try." Id. The authors further argue that a basic invention potentially covers many improvements, and "a single rightholder [may] underdevelop-or even ignore totally-many of the potential improvements encompassed by their broad property right." Id. at 873-74.
175. See id. at 873.
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ventor must frequently involve additional parties in the development process. This requires that the inventor be able to enter
into a wide range of arrangements with other firms. 176 The
post-MedImmune jurisprudence, however, does not recognize
that innovation is frequently a multiple-actor process that requires low-risk transferability of inventions. This failure is significant because an inventive system that does not properly in177
centivize post-inventive activities runs the risk of failing.
Despite the apparent gloom, discretionary rejection of declaratory judgment jurisdiction offers an opportunity to disencumber patent licensing.
III. DISCRETION AFTER MEDIMMUNE
The post-MedImmune period provides a fresh opportunity
to rationalize and disambiguate the discretionary component of
the DJA. The effort to cleave discretion from jurisdiction is confused by the corpus of Federal Circuit jurisprudence that is inconsistent and oftentimes misguided in distinguishing between
power and prudence.1 78 The appropriate exercise of courts' discretion can, however, service the core policies behind the DJA
while mitigating MedImmune's chilling effects on socially productive licensing activity.
At a high level of abstraction, discretion is ground in broad
179
An imconsiderations of "equit[y], pruden[ce], and policy."
to
is
the
extent
MedImmune
portant policy consideration after
over
are
prioritized
system
of
the
patent
which the incentives
the benefits of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Specifically,
to what extent is the free transfer of patent licenses encouraged
and to what extent is this activity inhibited by easy declaratory
judgment jurisdiction? The answers to these questions, as discussed above, necessarily implicate the degree to which patentees are rewarded for their inventive activity and the extent to
which the public benefits from the patent system.
176. See id.
177. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707-08 (2001) (cataloguing potential
post-patent activities, including: developing the invention into a commercial
embodiment, raising capital, obtaining production facilities and labor, and informing consumers of the product or service).
178. See, e.g., Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 405 F.3d 990, 994
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (Gajarsa, J., dissenting); Dolak, supra note 36, at 419.
179. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007)
(describing the discretionary considerations the district court could consider
upon remand).
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Considering the benefits of patent licensing activity discussed in Part II, courts should incentivize socially useful licensing activity by giving greater deference to patentee's licensing efforts. In particular, discretion should be based on the
totality of circumstances, with courts making a "pragmatic
judgment, aware of the business realities that are involved" in
18 0
the licensing and negotiation process.
The difficulty with articulating a broader, more coherent
discretionary standard is that discretion is an ambiguous concept, and the propriety of using discretion to refuse jurisdiction
in a particular case must be based on the facts and circumstances of each case. 8 1 Nonetheless, the wide discretion given to
courts can and should be used to meet the practical requirements of each situation before the court. 182
While discretion is ultimately evaluated based on all the
facts at hand, it is nonetheless instructive to explore three objective considerations defining the legal relationship between a
plaintiff seeking declaratory judgment relief and a defendant
opposing the remedy: the scope and content of communications
between the parties, the extent of ongoing negotiations between
parties, and the size of the parties. The Federal Circuit analyzed the first two considerations in its reasonableapprehension framework, in which these factors were given jurisdictional weight.1 8 3 While the considerations entering into
the declaratory judgment calculus have undoubtedly changed
since MedImmune, it is nonetheless instructive to explore preMedImmune jurisdictional factors in the discretionary context.
A. THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
PARTIES
The Federal Circuit's formalistic treatment of communications prior to MedImmune-reviewing the contents for evidence
of a reasonable apprehension on the part of the nonpatentee
that the patentee might bring suit-received much criticism
and frequently led to unpredictable results.18 4 An express
180. Shorewood Med. Indus., Inc. v. Deknatel, Inc., 512 F.2d 724, 728 (8th
Cir. 1975).
181. See, e.g., Edwin Borchard, Discretion to Refuse Jurisdictionof Actions
for Declaratory Judgments, 26 MINN. L. REV. 677, 681-82 (1942) (discussing
declaratory judgment in the insurance context).
182. See BORCHARD, supra note 12, at 296.
183. See, e.g., Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 883
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
184. See generally Dolak, supranote 16, at 923-37.
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charge of patent infringement was not required to sustain declaratory judgment jurisdiction;1 8 5 nor was the absence of communications between a patentee and alleged infringer prior to
suit a per se reason for foregoing declaratory judgment jurisdiction.18 6 Despite this past history, the character and content of
communications between a patentee and potential licensee can
yield probative evidence for dismissing declaratory judgment
jurisdiction on discretionary grounds.
It is initially important to note that a court should look at
the substance rather than the form of communications because
parties can couch their exchanges in terms designed to defeat
declaratory judgment. 8 7 Once this is done, communications
should be evaluated on a sliding scale based on their contents
and apparent motive.
At one end of the spectrum are communications in which a
patent owner merely inquires about another party's products or
activities without asserting her patent rights. These communications allow a patent owner to make good faith inquiries into
potential infringement of her patent, yet should not subject her
to the burden and expense of defending a lawsuit. 8 8 Using discretion to forego exercising declaratory judgment jurisdiction in
these situations enhances the patent system's goal of fostering
and rewarding invention. 189
185. See Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(stating that "an express charge of infringement is not required" for an actual
controversy to arise); see also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers,
Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1987), abrogated by MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
186. See Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731,
736 (Fed. Cir. 1988), abrogatedby MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. 764; Dewey & Almy
Chem. Co. v. Am. Anode, Inc., 137 F.2d 68, 70-71 (3d Cir. 1943) (describing
that an actual controversy may exist even though a defendant first learned of
the plaintiff's conduct upon receipt of the complaint).
187. See, e.g., EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811-12 (Fed. Cir.
1996), abrogated by MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. 764.
188. See Am. Needle & Novelty Co. v. Schuessler Knitting Mills, Inc., 379
F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1967) ("The owner of a patent should have the privilege
of making a fair investigation as to the possible infringement of his patent
without calling down on his head the undertaking of a defense of an expensive
and burdensome declaratory judgment suit alleging invalidity and noninfringement."). The court found that a letter from the defendant's attorney,
requesting a sample of Plaintiff's product and mentioning that it "may conflict" with his patent, did not serve as a charge of infringement. Id.
189. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) ("[P]atent
law seeks to foster and reward invention .... "). This goal cannot be adequately accomplished unless patentees safely explore the scope and content of a potential infringer's activities.

1994

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:1966

At the other end of the spectrum are communications in
which the patent owner makes express charges of infringement
and threatens litigation. 190 The insecurity these communications create vis-&-vis a potential infringer's legal liabilities and
ongoing conduct create the precise situation the declaratory
judgment mechanism was designed to remedy. 19 1 The need for
clarifying legal relationships and affording relief from uncertainty and insecurity in this context strongly militates against
using discretion to forego declaratory judgment relief.
A third type of correspondence can occur where a potential
infringer/licensee approaches a patentee. 92 If the patent owner
fails to respond with charges of infringement, it is important to
consider protecting the "quiescent patent owners against unwarranted litigation" by foregoing declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 93 In these situations, "it seems best to limit declaratory relief for the infringer to cases in which an adversary claim
has been made against him .... This requirement... [protects

against] the fear that patentees might be harassed by prospective infringers and be obliged continually to defend their pa94

tents."1

Disavowal of infringement or intent to sue should likewise
be considered before subjecting a patentee to the burdens of a
lawsuit. A patentee's ability to accurately evaluate the scope of
a potential infringer's conduct is limited prior to entering discussions. 95 While the patentee can provide the opposing party
190. See, e.g., Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid Ltd., 141 F.3d 1479, 1482 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (reversing a district court's dismissal of a declaratory judgment action). This case is exemplary of the absurd results that were possible with
strict application of the Federal Circuit's two-part reasonable-apprehension
test. The district court found that Fina lacked a reasonable apprehension of a
lawsuit. Id. at 1480. This was despite that fact that Baroid sent two letters
stating that it would be an act of infringement if Fina imported its product into the United States and that it intended to vigorously protect and enforce its
patent rights. Id. at 1482.
191. See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 735 (discussing the unfortunate conditions
that led up to the enactment of the DJA).
192. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 886 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (stating that Shell initiated the first meeting with the patentee Amoco);
CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Beloit Corp., 957 F. Supp. 784, 790 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(reasoning that there was no reasonable apprehension of suit because the
nonpatentee initiated the correspondence and the patentee never expressed an
opinion that the nonpatentee was infringing).
193. Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736.
194. BORCHARD, supra note 12, at 807.
195. Cf.Bessen & Meurer, supra note 157, at 28 ("[A]bout a quarter of patent lawsuits occur between firms that are in different industries and are also

2008]

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

1995

with a covenant not to sue and divest the court of jurisdiction to
hear the case, this action may bar subsequent suit over the patent against the same party.196 A patentee should be able to retract misplaced charges of infringement without being forced to
engage in extensive litigation. 197 A patentee's effort to disavow
her previous communications represents a form of "changed
circumstances," which the Federal Circuit has previously recognized as dissipating the need for a lawsuit. 198
B. THE EXTENT OF ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS
One purpose of the DJA is to "enable parties to adjudicate
disputes before either side suffers great damage." 199 However,
"accelerated judicial intervention creates the risk of burdening
the courts and the litigants with disputes that were otherwise
destined to disappear by themselves."20 0 To forestall misapplication of the declaratory judgment remedy, courts should consider the pendency of negotiations or the potential to engage in
negotiations before entertaining declaratory judgment jurisdiction. When there are proposed or ongoing license negotiations,
a court should avoid accepting a litigation controversy until the
negotiations have broken down. 201
'technologically distant,' suggesting that innovating firms may be unable to
completely 'clear' their technology for possible infringement in advance.").
196. See, e.g., Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d
1054, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that there is no actual controversy where
a patent holder "is forever estopped by its counsel's statement of nonliability
... from asserting liability against [the alleged infringer] in connection with
any products that [it] made, sold, or used"); Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller
Co., 940 F.2d 631, 636-38 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that the controversy was
rendered moot when the declaratory judgment defendant filed a covenant not
to sue the declaratory judgment plaintiff for infringement of the patent in suit,
and that the patent holder was "forever estopped from asserting the ... patent
claims against [the declaratory judgment plaintiff]").
197. But see Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid Ltd., 141 F.3d 1479, 1483-84
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that the patentee's actions created a reasonable apprehension of suit that supported a declaratory judgment action and that the
patentee's subsequent efforts to disavow the threatening letters were insufficient because the patentee failed to provide assurances that it would not sue).
198. See id. at 1484. While the court addressed "changed circumstances" in
the framework of its prior reasonable-apprehension test, see id., the underlying policy rationale remains and keeps the concept applicable to the discretionary analysis.
199. In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., Inc., 838 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988).
200. Id.
201. See Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57
F.3d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1995), abrogatedby MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 127 S.Ct. 764 (2007).
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Where there is an initial offer to negotiate but no response
prior to seeking declaratory judgment relief, judicial economy
argues for discretionarily foregoing jurisdiction. 202 In this situation, not allowing negotiations would "create a strong disincentive for patentees to communicate with potential infringers before filing suit, for fear of being sued first and thus forced to
20 3
litigate in the defendant's forum of choice."
Likewise, the existence of ongoing negotiations offers an
opportunity for less disruptive, less costly, and more amicable
resolution. Parties to a negotiation may tactically seek judicial
intervention because the value of a potential license almost always declines in value with litigation. 204 Courts should judiciously exercise discretion to forego declaratory judgment jurisdiction where serious negotiations are pending.
Despite the strong rationale for giving negotiations deference, where licensing negotiations would be futile or have proven ineffective, there is little need for giving them significant
weight. 20 5 In this situation, the danger of relying on continued
negotiations to forego exercising declaratory judgment jurisdiction is that parties may tactically be "feigning interest in continued negotiations merely to deflect a declaratory judgment
action."20 6 If such a situation exists, a court may properly ac207
cept jurisdiction.
C. THE SIZE OF THE PARTIES

As discussed in Part II, most U.S. patents are issued to
large corporate entities. These large firms operate differently
than small entities. For example, large firms possess a variety
of means for extracting value from their large patent portfolios
202. See, e.g., Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Transonic Sys., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d
1009, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (stating that the court would use its discretion to
forego entertaining declaratory judgment jurisdiction where there was an outstanding offer to negotiate).
203. Id. at 1012-13.
204.

See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VALUATION 155 (Weston Anson & Don-

na Suchy eds., 2005).
205. See, e.g., Ciraco, supra note 147, at 55-57, 88-89 (suggesting that if
parties' interests are too misaligned or if parties are not genuinely engaged in
alternative dispute resolution, formal adjudicative resolution may be most appropriate).
206. See EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 815 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (affirming the lower court's decision not to exercise declaratory judgment jurisdiction because there were continuing negotiations), abrogated by MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
207.

Id.
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(i.e., cross-licensing), whereas small firms typically rely on exclusion and licensing as the dominant source of their patent

value. 208 Further, small firms and independent inventors file
patent lawsuits about three times more often than other patent
holders on a per patent basis. 209 Given these differences, there

may be some policy motivations to be more solicitous toward
210
small entities in licensing situations.
Direct evidence already shows that "small firms avoid R&D
areas where the threat of litigation from larger firms is
high."2 11 Moreover, because both trading patents and repeated

interactions in the marketplace are important for patent dispute resolution, individual inventors and small firms are handicapped at enforcing their intellectual property rights through
extrajudicial resolution. 21 2 This evidence suggests that courts
should be more solicitous toward accepting declaratory judgment jurisdiction where the party seeking jurisdiction is a
small entity and the would-be defendant is a large entity. Contrawise, where a small firm is the patentee, it is important to
recognize that small firms are generally unable to internalize
the risks inherent in the innovation process, and instead, they
rely on strong licensing relationships to shift risk to their licensees. 21 3 This evidence suggests that courts should be more reserved in accepting declaratory judgment jurisdiction where
the patentee has a resource disparity relative to the plaintiff
seeking declaratory judgment.
CONCLUSION
MedImmune and its progeny have abrogated the Federal
Circuit's reasonable-apprehension test for declaratory judgment jurisdiction and placed the patent licensing community in
an uncertain position. A patent holder seeking to license her
208. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 2, at 12-13.
209. See id. at 13.
210. See, e.g., Ryobi Am. Corp. v. Peters, 815 F. Supp. 172, 175 (D.S.C.
1993) (failing to find a justiciable controversy because, inter alia, the patentee
was "not a large business with ample resources to support a major litigation
effort," but rather, was "an individual who has created a small side line business in his home workshop").
211. See Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 157, at 48-49.
212. See id. at 46-48.
213. Cf.Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, DethroningLear: Licensee Estoppel and
the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 679 (1986) (criticizing the Supreme Court's analysis in Lear for failing to consider the economic function
provided by licensee estoppel).
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invention may be subject to the costs and burdens of defending
her patent in litigation should a potential licensee disagree on
the necessity of obtaining a license.
The recent change in patent law has the potential to drastically inhibit licensing activities. This is significant because
patent licensing is an important vehicle for rewarding patentees for their inventive effort, sharing information between
otherwise closed firms, and is often necessary to develop followon technologies that advantage the public. Courts can and
should use discretion to capture the realities that are involved
in patent licensing. In particular, courts should review licensorlicensee relationships by looking at the types of communications between the parties, the existence of potential or ongoing
negotiations, and the size of the parties when deciding to use
discretion to forego accepting certain declaratory judgment actions.

